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Vision, faces, identities: technologies of recognition 
by Perle Møhl 
 
In: The Biometric Border World: Technology, Bodies and Identities on the Move. Olwig, K. F., 
Grünenberg, K., Møhl, P. & Simonsen, A. (eds.). London & New York: Routledge, p. 83-99. 
 
This chapter analyses technologies of border control that operate through recognition. 
The technologies are used in various border settings, but are united by a shared techno-
temporal quality, namely that they identify persons and objects by comparing them to 
already registered IDs and already known threats. The chapter will first describe the 
principles and visual skills involved in running the Automated Border Control system in 
Copenhagen Airport, comparing them with face-to-face (‘manual’) border control and 
random checks on intra-Schengen flights. Secondly, the use of an X-ray scanner to 
determine the contents and possible threats of passenger luggage in Gibraltar Airport will 
be analysed. In all these cases, humans and machines deploy refined and often 
interlaced visual and sensory skills or methods to determine whether a person or an 
object may pass or requires further scrutiny. This work engages with a complex 
combination of data, recognition and memory, and sensing and sensory skills that come 
to be mutually formative. The machinic operations are largely based on and formed 
according to human capacities and at the same time format how and what the humans 
operating the technologies come to sense and see, as well as ‘unsee’, in an interplay of 
continued enskillment and deskillment. We could tentatively characterize this integrated 
human-technological border assemblage as cyborgian (Haraway, Wolfe, and Haraway 
2017; Wells 2014) in that human and technological processes and sensory connections 
supplement and reinforce one another. But, as we shall see, they sometimes also 
destabilize one another’s operations and skills and work in more contested and 
disconnected ways, thus undermining the analytical pertinence of the connected 
symbiotic cyborg. 
The chapter further analyses the kinds of suspicious relations – notably between faces 
and identities – that arise and undergo scrutiny in border control and the thresholds of 
resemblance that are required to pass border control: that is, how much one needs to 
resemble one’s ID photo. Finally, the chapter presents a particular element of airport 
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security control where known threats appear artificially on the security agents’ screens 
to check not the luggage itself but the skills and alertness of the agent. In all these 
examples, sign relations are established between objects and meanings. On the surface 
these relations appear simple and direct, but they are in fact enmeshed in and enskilled 
through a complex political, economic and social community of practice. The chapter 
attempts to single out a few of these semiotic operations, the forces they are regulated 
and influenced by, and the effects they have on the production of identities, threats and 
borders. 
Settings and technologies 
As mentioned in the introduction to Part II, I carried out fieldwork with border police in 
three main settings: Copenhagen Airport, Gibraltar Airport and the territory’s land border 
with Spain, and in Ceuta on the border between Spain and Morocco. The goal was to 
analyse the different types of technologies that were used to detect and deter threats and 
to compare their workings. The border control processes I present in Chapter 4 concern 
different forms of presence detection used mainly in Ceuta. In the two airport settings, 
however, control was to a large extent technologized and automatized, and control of 
identities and objects took place through processes of identification and recognition, as 
we shall see.  
This chapter therefore takes us to the two airport settings, starting with the Schengen 
passport control in Copenhagen Airport. Here police and civil border guards supervise 
the running of an automated facial recognition system devised and installed by the 
Portuguese company Vision-Box and maintained by a Danish service company, 
Biometric Solutions. The system is called the ABC – Automated Border Control – and 
consists of nine ‘eGates’, three of which can be adjusted for use from both sides to 
accommodate different passenger flows. Besides the automated eGates, the border zone 
also consists of a row of ‘manual’ passport control booths where border guards physically 
check passports and visas. Specifically for migration control objectives, police officers 
also carry out random checks on intra-Schengen flights arriving from so-called ‘high-
risk’ cities in southern Europe. After describing and analysing the sensory and interpretive 
work involved in these operations, the analysis then moves to Gibraltar Airport, where 
police officers survey the screens of X-ray scanners, inspect passenger luggage, detect 
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possible threats, make assumptions about the identities of the travellers from the objects 
they can identify, and assess whether it ‘all makes sense’. 
In all these cases, the border guards are presented with imagery, scans, objects and 
faces that they need to single out, identify and assess in a series of complex human–
machine interactions and intricate processes of reading and interpreting signs. These 
readings are based on already identified threats, as well as on assumptions about the 
translucence and authority of the images and their direct relation to specific persons, 
objects and lives. 
The analysis in this chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in Copenhagen Airport 
and Gibraltar Airport over a period of five months during 2016-2017. 
Facial recognition and looking like a picture 
At Copenhagen Airport, Hanne, a border guard, is surveying her two screens. She has 
turned on the computer and the ABC system that monitors the eGates, has logged into 
the system and has opened the access to the different national and international police 
databases (national ID, watch lists, wanted persons, etc.). She activates the six eGates 
she is in charge of, and the green lamps turn on, inviting the first travellers into the ABC. 
From her little glass booth, Hanne has an overview of all the gates and the travellers 
passing through them. She picks up her mouse and starts working, shifting her attention 
between the ABC screen, the faces and bodies of the travellers, and the database screen 
when something appears on it. With a click, or using the touchscreen, she can ‘help’ the 
ABC, checking the irregularities it identifies, overriding it when it makes mistakes and 
turning it off when it ‘starts glitching’. Otherwise she simply checks that it ‘does its job’. 
She is in radio contact with her colleagues on the floor and in the other control booths 
and can tell them when she sees something suspicious – people changing queues or 
looking nervous, or switching from the ABC to the manual control booths. 
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Figure 1. Comparing 2D photos to 3D faces in the ABC control booth 
(© photo by the author) 
 
The ABC uses a facial recognition system where the ID photo in the biometric passport 
is compared to the face of the person passing through the control. The passport contains 
a so-called ‘template’ of the facial features of the ID photo, that is, a series of 
measurements of distances of key points in the photographed face. In passing through 
the eGate the same features are measured on the traveller, and a new template is 
produced and compared to that from the ID photo. Thus, contrary to human recognition, 
algorithmic recognition does not compare actual faces to photographed faces but 
templates extracted from both. Comparing the template from the photo and the one from 
the live face, the ABC algorithm produces a comparison score that has to meet a certain 
threshold for the exit door to open. The score can range from 100 – total resemblance – 
to 0 – no resemblance whatsoever. And it actually does vary quite a lot while Hanne is 
looking at her screen. 
Hanne is a senior police officer who has been working in the ABC since it arrived five 
or six months previously. She is a ‘super-user’, training newcomers, and she likes 
working with the ABC, defending ‘it’ vehemently when a colleague launches into 
criticism of it during a break or when I ask her. She finds it amusing, even touching, 
when it mistakes a suitcase for a second person, when it can’t see because of the sunlight, 
or when ‘it gets confused’ and starts glitching. She talks to it and often laughs, describing 
it as having a consciousness, moods and sensory frailties that resemble her own, as when 
humans ascribe consciousness and will to their computer to explain its intricacies and 
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malfunctions (Jackson 2002). To her colleagues’ objections that in the end it will make 
them all useless, she says ‘Well, it can be turned off. We can’t.’ She is confident that 
human skills will always be indispensable in border control. She will be retiring from the 
service in a couple of months, a year at the most – which might explain why she does 
not feel menaced by the machine as some of her younger colleagues do.  
A traveller arrives at the entrance to the eGate, places his biometric passport on the 
scanner, and the passport is read by the ABC system. After some moments the passport 
photo and the chip photo, as well as the contained ID information, appear on Hanne’s 
screen. If the two photos are identical – that is, if the picture in the passport hasn’t been 
replaced with another one – and if the passport is biometric, undamaged and in 
compliance with the ABC system, the first glass door automatically opens, and the 
traveller is invited into the eGate. Up until now, only the passport has undergone 
scrutiny. Now it’s time to check that the person in the document and the person in the 
eGate are the same – or, rather, that the face in the document and in the eGate look 
sufficiently alike. 
The traveller is asked to stand on a pair of yellow footsteps on the floor, the entrance 
door closes, and the traveller is trapped inside the eGate with no possible escape route. 
The camera moves up and down, small lamps blinking, and finally settles in front of the 
traveller’s face. What goes on in the entrails of the ABC – what it sees, what it is doing, 
thinking or processing, which databases it is linked to and checking right now, what it 
remembers – all that is invisible and unknown to the traveller, who just waits in front of 
the camera and the closed door. From her position in the ABC booth, Hanne can check 
the ABC’s algorithmic operations on her screen by making a line of algorithmic 
operations appear in a little window next to the facial images of the traveller. Prompted 
by my question, she opens the operations list and admits she has never really looked at 
it before and doesn’t know how to read it. She has up to six gates to survey and no time 
to check what the ABC is doing, as long as it is running smoothly and showing no alerts 
of detected irregularities or ‘signs of fatigue’, as she says. 
The live face of a traveller in the eGate shows up on Hanne’s screen, and the ABC 
starts comparing the facial templates from the passport with the direct cameras. If the 
comparison score is high enough, meeting the ‘recognition threshold’ – usually 
Chapter 3  Perle Møhl 
somewhere between 40 and 50, depending on the settings – the gate will open, and the 
person has successfully passed the border. But it does not always go that smoothly. The 
ABC system is hyper-sensitive, Hanne says, and if one eGate starts having problems, it 
sometimes spreads from one gate to another ‘like a viral infection’.  If there’s too much 
light or too little, or if people are moving around or are carrying a lot of bags, it ‘can’t 
see properly’. Often a second-line police officer has to step in to indicate the right 
position and posture if the traveller doesn’t comply with the system’s specifications. 
‘Stand still, not too close’. ‘Take off your glasses’. ‘Take off your hat’. ‘Remove your veil’. 
‘Look at the camera’ – modifying their appearance until the door opens. 
 
 
Figure 2. The author in the ABC, trying to look like the ID photo, more or 
less successfully(© photo by the author). 
 
Thus, in fact, to pass through the ABC requires that one looks sufficiently like the face in 
the ID photo, whether the passport is one’s own or someone else’s. The little ABC 
enclosure becomes a theatre of inquisition where one is under suspicion until the 
algorithm has finished analysing and comparing faces and templates, and the glass doors 
open. On this stage, people are told straighten their hair, smile or stop smiling, in order 
to ‘look sufficiently’ like the photo to meet the threshold of resemblance. The ABC is 
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reacting directly to their capacity to look like the face in the photo, displaying the 
changing comparison score – …13…35…22…44! – as the face in front of the camera 
changes appearance. The ID photo itself has been formatted for the occasion of making 
the passport, with strict instructions on how to look and how not to look.1 More than a 
site of identification, the ABC becomes a scene of semblance, of mimicry, of creating an 
iconic likeness with the photo – a photo that is an already formatted version of a face, 
often captured many years earlier. Thus the recognition system, whether automated or 
human, is based on the comparison between a supposed original – which here ironically 
becomes the ID photo – and a suspicious-until-verified replica, the face of the traveller. 
Inversely, what the ABC and the border guards are assessing is not the identity of a 
person in all his/her social and existential intricacies – something that could never be 
transformed into simple ID information (Feldman 2013; Møhl forthcoming) – but the 
travellers’ skills in iconicity and mimicry of a small 2D photographic version of a face. 
All authority is vested in this small simulacrum and in its indexical relationship to a 
particular ID, and control consists in the capacity of the algorithms and the border guards 
to see and read it, to re-cognize the ID-face in the living face. One could argue that the 
ID photo has taken over the identity – or at least the ID – of the person who was originally 
photographed. The photo has become the original to which the traveller must conform, 
whether it is her/his own or someone else’s passport. As Susan Coutin observes, to pass 
a border, one becomes eligible by producing the adequate documents, for ‘documents 
confer, rather than derive from, statuses’ (Coutin 2003: 60). A person can ‘claim an 
identity’ simply by waving a document, as a frustrated border official remarked to 
Gregory Feldman (2013: 142). As such, the simplest way to derive an adequate status 
and pass the border is, Coutin notes, to purchase fraudulent documents. Or, since the 
introduction of biometric passports in Europe, to purchase valid biometric documents 
with ID photos with which one can produce a reasonable level of resemblance, just as 
long as there is a valid document and, in my analysis, an ID photo with which to 
conform. As such, it is the capacity for resemblance and mimicry that confers status. 
Indeed, documents can be tampered with, photos can be replaced. But the DocuUnit 
at the airport police department teaches the border guards to detect forged documents 
and passports, and they are pretty good at it. They learn to see the irregularities in the 
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printing, the cuts and tears, the missing watermarks, to feel the stitching, the thickness of 
the pages and the embossing, and to listen to the sound of the plastic when tapping it 
with a nail or on the desk. The differences are minute and imperceptible to the untrained, 
but the border guards’ enskilled senses are proficient in these matters. And in the ABC, 
the algorithm compares the visible ID photo to the chip photo to determine if they are 
identical. So, forged documents are becoming a rarity, especially since the introduction 
of biometric passports. Instead, the most common document fraud currently detected in 
Copenhagen Airport is not persons travelling on forged documents, but rather on another 
person’s valid document – ‘impersonation’ (Frontex 2013). This is confirmed notably by 
our research among migrants (see Chapters 6-7) who prefer to travel on borrowed or 
bought legitimate documents when trying to pass border control. All it takes is to look 
sufficiently like the person in the small ID photo. 
On this little stage of mimicry and unmasking, the border guards employ their own 
personal tactics. Hanne has been working with the ABC since it was installed and is 
gradually adjusting her senses to the work of the machine. As she says, ‘I’m learning to 
see in 2D’, comparing the 2D screen photo to the actual ‘3D’ face in the eGate. She 
enjoys trying to outsmart the machine, ‘seeing more quickly’ than the machine, making 
her identity assessment before the ABC opens its doors and sets the traveller free. And to 
do that, she says, she has to ‘see like the machine’. According to this logic, her vision is 
being transformed by adapting it to the ABC’s vision and scans of small ID photos, 
switching between the depth of living, changeable, fleshy faces in front of her and the 
black-and-white imprints of their superficies. She is learning to see in other ways, her 
vision is being formatted by how the ABC sees and by the materiality of photographic 
technologies and how they work and convey knowledge – how they epitomize and 
essentialize identities by linking those fleshy faces and bodies to the data in the 
document. 
I ask Hanne if she thinks the ABC sees better and is more efficient than humans. She 
is not sure, she says. ‘No one is foolproof, not the machines nor the humans’. She alludes 
to the predicament that no one can know how many have actually managed to fool 
passport control. ‘How could we know? They went unnoticed!’ Then, to make her point, 
she tells me that some days earlier an airline agent prevented a traveller from boarding 
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a flight because he was trying to travel on another person’s passport. Yet he had made it 
through the manual passport control. The officers of the DocuUnit apprehended him 
and, while they were at it, ran him and the passport through the ABC three times to see 
how it reacted, and he actually almost passed once. The case speaks directly to the 
overarching predicament of nescience in policing and security: never knowing who 
wasn’t stopped, how many went unnoticed. But Hanne keeps the discussion at a more 
practical level: ‘People who want to cheat probably don’t choose the ABC. I’m not sure 
it works better, but apparently people think it does, so they chose the human border 
guard…’ She concludes, ‘It depends on a lot of things. Sometimes the machine sees 
better, sometimes the human eye does’. 
 
 
Figure 3. When the ABC starts glitching, there are several solutions; one of them 
is to turn it off (© photo by the author). 
 
Indeed, when I have seen cases of obviously different faces in the ABC and in the 
scanned passport, it has always been someone who accidently took the wrong passport, 
for example, couples inadvertently switching passports just before going into the ABC 
or, as happened once, someone who took his mother’s passport with him. Or a border 
guard checking that the ABC is up and working, as one of them does every morning 
when he starts his guard by trying to pass through the ABC using a prop passport and 
grimacing to mimic the ID photo of a rather chubby man. Through this routine check, 
he also seems to be assuring himself that the ABC  – and with it, the whole service – 
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can’t be fooled, that it is still sufficiently on guard and, importantly, that the recognition 
threshold has not been lowered overnight. In sum, he checks that the border is still there 
and working. 
In the ABC, ID photos play a major part in the work of border control. The ABC itself 
‘looks at’ and compares faces with ID photos, the border guards in their booth do much 
the same, keeping pace with the machine, and everything is to a large extent based on 
the indexical authority of the photographic image to contain and convey the truthful link 
between face and identity. 
Hanne’s enskilled vision plays a huge role. But she also uses her other senses, listening 
to the sounds in the room and on the radio, surveying the bustle and the reactions of 
people in the queues. This multi-sensoriality becomes even more acute when she moves 
over to the manual passport control. 
 
‘Manual control’, making sense and questions of plausibility 
In both the ABC and the manual control booth, the border guards use their eyes to look 
at passports, photos, faces, behaviour: who is looking nervous, changing queues, etc. 
But in the ‘manual’ control, the border guards sit close to the travellers and deploy ‘all 
their senses, including the sixth’, as Ole, one of Hanne’s colleagues says. And in the 
manual control, Ole adds, they are not restricted, as in the ABC, to controlling travellers 
on the basis of already registered images and data. In the manual control they can pry 
into the future, they can use their ‘creativity and intuition’. ‘You can have people whose 
papers are perfectly in order, but who behave strangely’. 
I sit in with Ole and Hanne in their joint manual control booth in a border zone where 
flights arrive from extra-Schengen airports defined as ‘high-risk’. Arriving passengers are 
separated from other passengers by an intricate network of corridors that sends them to 
an extra security check and a secluded baggage reclaim because they are arriving from 
airports where security control is considered insufficient by Schengen standards. 
Ole and Hanne comment on their work as the travellers arrive, giving a sense of the 
variety of their sensory work. They check heights using an old-fashioned height-meter. 
They look – down at the document, up at the face, out at the queues, down, up, out. 
They listen to voices, explanations, intonations, accents. They touch the passports, feel 
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the stamps, the stitching and embossing, the newnesses and the wear-and-tear. They 
smell smells. They ask questions: ‘Where are you going?’, ‘What is your purpose there?’, 
‘Who are you visiting?’ They chat about destinations and origins, about the travellers’ 
children, about the weather. They scan passports, fingerprints and make photocopies. 
And while they are doing all that, in the twenty seconds or less that they have at their 
disposal for each traveller, they stitch together all the minute details they pick up, 
weaving the fragments into stories about the travellers’ intentions and agendas, and 
assessing the plausibility of those stories and whether they make sense or not, or, as Ole 
and Hanne put it, ‘whether two and two make four – or five’. They are pre-empting, 
thinking ahead, imagining and assessing potential threats – that is, events in the future – 
based on the thickness of the here-and-now, and not only on sparse ID data from the 
past and a small ID photo. Unlike in the ABC booth, they work with their versatility, their 
capacity to cognize, to improvize, to combine disparate details and imagine scenarios 
about unknown futures. Ole definitely prefers the manual control and the human contact 
it requires: ‘The machine can’t think. It’s stupid and can only obey orders given by 
humans. It can’t think ahead. I have intuition, I’m creative.’ 
The way they look at people here is different, ‘more full-scale’, as some of them say. 
This is because they deploy all their senses in a synaesthetic manner where the senses 
collaborate to thicken the appreciation and perception, and because in the direct 
interaction they can ‘read’ people in more dimensions: temporally, with regard to their 
past movements and their intentions, and socially, in their interactions with others and 
in the ways they perform and present themselves. The enskillment of the border guards’ 
senses is not, as in the ABC, formatted by a particular technology that they learn to see 
through and that they also have to watch over, surveying its modes of vision, its visual 
impairments and its viral infections.  
Analysing vision and sensorial-aesthetic relations with the farming landscape in 
Normandy, Judith Okely distinguishes between a distant, unengaged gaze and a seeing 
that involves the entire body and all the senses, and that is based on years of practice 
and physical bodily engagement with the landscape (Okely 2001). When Okely looks 
at the agricultural landscape, she searches for ‘significance in everything encountered’ 
(ibid.: 111), as I do when I look at luggage scans and travellers, and search for meaning 
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in every sign. She and I have not yet been trained to focus selectively on particular 
elements. In border control, as in farming – as in every ‘community of practice’ (Grasseni 
2007a: 203) – there are particular ways of seeing and identifying significance. In border 
control, training programs are set up to teach the border guards and security officers 
what to see and what not to see, notably when looking for details in a passport and 
scrutinizing a face. Cristina Grasseni, working with cattle breeders who really know how 
to look at a cow, operates with the same fundamental distinction between distant and 
immersed forms of vision. She describes ‘good looking’ as a trained perception, a 
cognitive form of apprenticeship that is culturally inculcated and socially performed 
(Grasseni 2007b), a schooling of the eye that ‘is at once aesthetic, moral, functional, and 
normative’ (Grasseni 2018). 
The political and ideological background of border control and the way the particular 
border is defined and determines threats and intruders form a basic setting for all the 
border guards’ work, whether in the ABC or in manual border control. But the 
technological, material and sensory aspects of the different work stations and tasks seem 
to play just as important a role in the way the guards perform their tasks and how they 
define and detect threats. 
In the following, we accompany a couple of border guards on another type of 
‘manual’ mission in order to examine how it is mainly the organizational framework of 
that mission that makes the border guards see in yet other ways and focus on other 
objects, aspects and appearances than they do in the ABC and the manual control booth. 
‘Random checks’ on ‘high-risk flights’: looking like a suspect 
Border police officers in Copenhagen Airport carry out a certain number of random ID 
checks every day on flights arriving to Copenhagen from other Schengen countries, 
which are normally exempt from border control. These checks are audited by police 
management, both to monitor that the checks are being done and to document the 
number of weekly checks in case Frontex,2 the European border control agency, controls 
their activities. 
Walking to the airport terminal used by budget airlines, where we will await the 
arrival of a plane from an Italian city, I accompany Hans, a short and sturdily built police 
agent, and his new female colleague, who is carrying out this type of arrival check for 
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the first time. Hans explains the principles to her as we walk: ‘We’re looking for illegal 
immigrants. So we don’t stop ‘Mr and Mrs Hansen’.’ She nods and seems to know what 
she is required to look for. While we wait for the plane to dock, I ask Hans how he can 
see whom to pick out if he can’t stop everyone. He has some techniques, he says. He 
can, for example, detect undocumented Afghan men without checking their passports: 
‘They try to blend in but always look sort of inept-smart. You know, jeans with holes in 
them. Sunglasses. And there’s always something with the shoes – they never fit the rest. 
Too fancy.’ 
The flight arrives, and they take up position in front of the arrival gate. Most passengers 
seem to be Danish tourists coming home. But four men, arriving one by one, could be 
of African origin. The first is pulled aside by Hans and, having observed him, his 
colleague pulls aside the next one and asks him to produce his documents. None of 
them put up any resistance. A third man is stopped by Hans, and a fourth passes by while 
the officers are preoccupied with the others. All the ones they check have valid 
documents. Hans smiles jovially and wishes them a welcome home or a continued good 
trip. He notes down the flight and number of the checked persons on a piece of old 
wrapping paper – ‘So the officer on duty can enter it into the system’ – and the two walk 
off to the other end of the airport to ‘randomly’ check another flight. 
Thus, what sorts of factors play a role in and frame what Hans and his colleague see 
and how they make distinctions in the task they are being asked to perform? Rather than 
personal choices and prejudices, it seems to be the notion of ‘high-risk flights’ that 
configures which persons Hans decides need to be checked and which persons to let 
pass. ‘High risk’ is used in a double sense by Frontex: 1) as a way to optimize resources 
by concentrating them on flights arriving from European regions of high migration influx 
(European Commission 2017a), instead of indiscriminately checking every flight – that 
is, in an organizational sense; and 2) when referring to passengers’ specific places of 
origin, that is, in a geographical sense. At Copenhagen Airport certain flights are 
therefore defined as high-risk because they arrive from cities within Schengen that 
Frontex and the national authorities consider possible avenues of ‘illegal migrants’ and 
refugees from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. When Hans and his colleagues randomly 
control such flights, the notion of ‘high risk’ therefore comes to relate to the countries of 
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origin of the possible migrants and asylum-seekers, meaning that they are in fact profiling 
nationalities and not just checking ‘randomly’. The notion of ‘high risk’ therefore 
logically, including for the border police officers themselves, implies that they are 
required to check ‘people who look high-risk’, which in this case means ‘from Africa or 
the Middle East’. And, as several officers have said to me, this is paradoxical because it 
makes them take decisions based on what effectively amounts to ‘ethnic profiling’.3 And 
even if they might want to contest the legality and ethics of these random checks that 
are making them select people based on how they look, the border control unit needs to 
do a certain number of random checks every week for future Frontex controls. As one 
border guard said, ‘If I wasn’t a racist before, this work is turning me into one’. Her 
personal opinion of certain ethnic groups had not changed, she said, but she was de 
facto required to be more suspicious of certain categories of passengers than of others 
based on their external physical appearance. She was being asked to apply a synoptic 
‘tunnel vision’ and to ‘see like a state’ (Scott 1998: 11) – in this case, a union of states, 
the EU – and not like a human being. 
In this example, the technologies involved are not material in kind but infrastructural, 
involving a range of EU policies and management orders, as well as the travel routes and 
modalities of migrants, which all contribute to establishing a particular form of legibility 
(ibid.) and set the conditions for how the border guards deploy their senses, what they 
look at and how they make decisions based on their visual perceptions. A pair of shoes 
that are too fancy or a particular kind of face or skin colour will raise the border guard’s 
perceptions above the suspicion threshold and provide the incentive to control the 
traveller. 
In a final example of recognitive skilfulness from my fieldwork at the Gibraltar Airport, 
we will see how border police use X-ray scanners to look through the surfaces of 
travellers’ luggage in search of threats. This example demonstrates how they are required 
to both see and unsee, and how their vision is being both skilled and deskilled by a 
mesmerizing system that is intended to keep them awake and alert to threats – specific 
known threats, that is. 
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Luggage scans, TIPs and the deskillment of vision 
In a secluded room at the bottom of the Gibraltar Airport terminal building, Veronica, a 
police officer, is surveying her screen. This is Security Level 2. There are no windows, 
and the artificial light is faint. She is sitting by a long desk, the only piece of furniture in 
the room except for a couple of chairs. She offers me one and seems content to have 
company. Somewhere else in the building, on Security Level 1, an automated X-ray 
scanner checks all luggage before it is sent down to the loading area. If the scanner 
identifies a suspicious object or an unidentifiable mass, it loads the piece of luggage onto 
a special conveyor belt, and an image of the piece of luggage pops up on the screen in 
the cellar. Here, Veronica has exactly twelve seconds to inspect the image. She can 
either validate the contents as nonthreatening by hitting the green button on the screen, 
sending the piece back into the ordinary flow of luggage headed for the airplane, or, if 
she sees a threat or has doubts, she will hit the red button and send it on to Security Level 
3. If she does not make a validation within the twelve seconds, it is taken as an indicator 
that she is either in doubt or inattentive, and the machine automatically sends the 
luggage on to the next, higher security level. 
In another room, Security Level 3, in the midst of the conveyor belts, Veronica’s 
colleague John receives the pieces of luggage that Veronica, or the automated system, 
have sent on for further inspection. John receives less luggage and has more time to look 
and reflect. He can turn the luggage X-ray image around, inspect it from all sides or 
move through the layers, and he has the time to see and identify particular objects to 
make his decision. But back in Level 2, Veronica only has her twelve seconds to look at 
the image and figure out why the automated system on Level 1 has deemed the piece 
suspect. She can use different filters to discern organic from non-organic and metal from 
soft materials, all displayed in different colours. But she rarely looks at what is inside the 
piece of luggage. She only has the time to register the blurry zones, the questionable 
unknowns, and to check for a couple of known threats – explosives, electric circuits, 
firearms – before hitting one of the buttons. She doesn’t actually see what is in the piece 
of luggage, she says – at least in the sense of remembering or being able to list it, 
attaching meaning to it. She is incapable of telling me what was in the last suitcase when 
I ask her. 
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We both look intently at the screen searching for threats as the pieces of luggage pass 
by, one after the other. ‘I have never seen an actual gun or bomb’, Veronica says. But 
she knows they will show up once in a while and that she has to be on her toes. Indeed, 
at regular intervals – every ten minutes or so – the machine produces a so-called ‘TIP’, a 
‘Threat Image Projection’, an X-ray image of a known security threat projected onto a 
piece of luggage.4 Veronica has to identify the threat and hit the red button within the 
twelve seconds. ‘This is to keep me alert’, she says, adding that it is also designed to 
check that she is doing her work properly and not sleeping. The results of her clicks on 
the TIP items are registered and presented to her at the end of the month and can lead 
to reprimands, she says.5 After some minutes, a suitcase arrives with an unmistakable 
gun inside; she hits the red button, and the image disappears. ‘You saw it?!’, she asks. I 
did. There was something uncanny about it. But I couldn’t say what, as it disappeared 
so quickly. 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of a TIP image (Threat Image Projection) (© photo by the author) 
 
The TIP system is in principle intended to counterbalance the routinization of the 
selective vision (Cutler and Paddock 2009) and a correlated unseeing because threats so 
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rarely, if ever, appear in actual traveller bags and thus on the screen. It is therefore 
intended to ensure that officers are regularly exposed to threats – albeit imaginary threats 
– so that their vision may be enskilled to seeing those threats, despite the lack of direct 
perceptions of actual firearms, weapon parts or explosives. 
This means that the threats that Veronica and her colleagues see are in fact not found 
in the travellers’ suitcases, but are produced by algorithms, technology developers and 
their depictions of already known threats. New and as yet un-encountered dangerous 
objects cannot be detected by the algorithms in Level 1, nor can they be projected on to 
the luggage images to train the officers to see them. The TIP algorithm therefore 
potentially produces another type of visual agnosia, since it repeatedly projects only 
knowns on to the screens and into the sight of the officers, formatting, limiting and quite 
possibly deskilling their perceptions by training them to recognize only what is already 
known, instead of using their own skills and intuitive sense of what could constitute 
possible threats. 
In addition to its pre-emptive functions and its potential deskillment of the officers’ 
senses, the TIP system, as Veronica also suggests, serves to audit the officers’ 
performance by monitoring detected and missed instances of artificial threats. This 
obviously situates the TIP system within the wide range of control mechanisms that 
govern by numbers, to which operators in any work setting are increasingly exposed 
(Shore and Wright 2015; Strathern 2000). It also further strengthens the suggestion that 
technologies of surveillance are, if not efficient in the detection of threats to national 
security, then at least efficient in controlling the controllers (see also Møhl 2018). 
Comparisons and conclusions 
This chapter has provided four examples of systems of threat assessment that work with 
different types of technology and infrastructural protocols. In the control booths in 
Copenhagen Airport, some protocols are data- and algorithm-based, whereas others 
operate primarily through human sensory and cognitive proficiencies and storytelling 
skills. These different operations of respectively human and technological observational 
skills, assessing the known and perceiving the unknown, are in practice tightly 
interwoven. They do, however, point to significant differences in temporality: between 
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technological re-cognition and human cognition, and respectively between identifying 
known and registered threats and felons based on data and prior registration, and seeking 
out and imaging unknown ones based primarily on the ambiguities of encounters in the 
here and now. Most human sensory and mental activity is based on recognition, and the 
balance between perceiving knowns and discovering unknowns is finely tuned and 
mainly reflects different forms of human cognitive behaviour. The border guards 
nevertheless constantly acquire new selective tacit skills from their direct experience and 
from digging further into suspect or unknown objects and details to substantiate or refute 
their intuitions and thus broaden their individual skills and sometimes also skills they 
share collectively. The data provided in the control booth and the TIP system, on the 
other hand, pointedly demonstrate the incapacity of algorithmic foresight. Both need the 
intervention of human agents to pick up and connect disparate details, to foresee and 
imagine connections and future scenarios. In that sense, data are quite impotent when it 
comes to assessing the now and the future. 
The ABC system of facial recognition functions within a realm of semblance and 
simulacres. It places the process of identification solely in the face and in the 
‘photographic original’ with which it is compared. The floor officer giving instructions is 
asking the person to conform to the photo by taking off their glasses, their veil, their 
smile. The person – and his or her identity – is reduced to, and implied to be contained 
in, the face, especially in the photographic version of the original face to which the 
traveller must conform to pass. There is an unfathomable faith in the indexicality of the 
image and its direct link to a previously existing face. In identity control, however, the 
image becomes the original and the travellers face becomes the re-presentation in an 
ironic semiotic inversion of object and representation. 
In all cases, trying to look like a photo or like a casually dressed young European – as 
Hans suggests some young migrants do, confirmed by the descriptions of migrants en 
route in Part III – amounts to conforming with and in a sense inhabiting a category 
(Rapport 2013). And, maybe most importantly, this points to the significance of the 
border guards’ awareness that people can and do move between categories and that 
identity is not something fixed, as the logics of ID and data would imply. 
The logics of the identification process also point to a hyper-focalization of the face 
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itself, whether original or actual, as the locus of identity. The face becomes a hyperbole, 
as implied in the notion of ‘faciality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Gates 2011) and ‘the 
imposition on the subject to assume a ‘face’’ (Rodrigues 2012: 3). In that sense, the ABC 
is a perfect example of what Deleuze and Guattari call an ‘abstract machine of faciality’ 
– it no longer works with humans or live faces or in any way with complex human 
identities, but with abstract ‘phantomized’ template versions of both the photographed 
‘original’ (linked to a dataset) and actual faces template-ified in the ABC. 
In the ABC and the luggage scans, the technologies tend to pick out zones and objects 
of interest and to produce threats, for example, as TIPs and as hits, productions that 
format the human senses and that may produce certain forms of agnosia in the 
interaction between these different forms of human-technological vigilance. By 
‘providing more exposure to threats’, as the developers say (see note 5), the TIP image 
ensures that officers are regularly exposed to imaginary threat so that their vision may be 
trained despite the lack of direct perceptions of actual weapon parts or explosives. This 
means that threats are not constituted by travellers and their objects, but produced by 
algorithms, technology developers and their assessments of currently known threats. The 
threat projections thus operate within the domain of hindsight. New and unknown, as 
yet unencountered dangerous objects can neither be detected by the algorithms nor 
projected on to the luggage images and trained by the officers. 
Border control is governed by a fundamental predicament, a pervasive uncertainty 
that cannot be represented in numbers and audits because by definition it goes 
unregistered. How many persons have actually managed to pass control without the 
proper documentation. How many went ‘under the radar’? There is no way of knowing. 
This prevailing spectre of uncertainty in border and security control sets a perfect scene 
for the prolific production of social imaginaries and story-telling. As we have seen, these 
stories are produced by assembling a variety of small cues into narratives that explain 
the presence and concurrence of those cues and that spell out apparent incongruities 
(see also Holmberg 2003). But they in no way create a full picture of who a traveller 
might be or have in mind – that dream of total transparency that any border guard system 
would like to possess and that the biometric technologies allegedly provide. Indeed, it is 
widely acknowledged that the technologies cannot keep that promise and that the small 
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details are only fragments that provide a basis only for hunches, not for truths. Indeed, 
the great unknown prevails and seems to fill the room around the working officers as an 
underlying tension in every act of decision-making they engage in. Am I making the right 
choice? Is the ABC making the right decision? Was that person who the passport said 
she was? Was that strange object in the suitcase a kitchen utensil or part of a bomb? Is 
the ABC working properly? 
The technological infrastructure that is supposed to help the officers in their work and 
eliminate most of the uncertainty tends to do the exact opposite, at least from the border 
guard’s perspective. Take, for example, the indecisiveness of the ABC. Every time it shifts 
from one recognition score to another, swinging back and forth between degrees of 
likeness and recognition, and gradually closing in on a passable recognition score, then 
lowering it again… – …13…35…22…44! – it very explicitly signals to the border guard 
looking at the screen that it is not sure. It also signals that likeness is a very relative and 
negotiable matter, a question of degree and approximation – very rarely at 100, more 
often oscillating between 20 and 50. So where the door to the traveller is decidedly 
either closed or open – either/or – the displayed, colourfully shifting recognition score is 
wholly ambiguous and only underscores the uncertainty of the border control 
endeavour. In the same manner – besides deskilling the officers’ vision – every time the 
TIP images appear on an officer’s screen, it indicates and reminds her that she and her 
vigilance are being controlled and are under suspicion. It places management control, 
suspicion and thus uncertainty at the forefront of the activity. 
And basically, can we trust the ABC and its complete reliance on ID photos and 
likenesses? As an airline officer recently answered when I asked him what he had 
checked in my passport, ‘I just check the date of expiration and the name.’ I persisted, 
‘And what about the ID photo?!’ ‘Oh, I don’t look at that. Photos can cheat.’ Although 
facial recognition involves complex and very high-tech operations and calculations and 
is presented and merchandized as a new generation of biometrics – transcending both 
human capacities and older forms of identity verification, and thus being the ultimate 
high-tech solution to the quest for shatterproof border control – facial recognition can in 
fact be circumvented with sufficient practical skill (or economic sway). The belief in its 
fool-proof qualities belongs to the myth of the ‘digital sublime’ (Mosco 2004) and its 
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claims to produce definitive truths about the relationship between faces and identities 
(Gates, 2011) rather than radically different mechanisms of sign analysis and control. 
While we should not belittle the potency of digital and data-based surveillance and 
border control technologies such as the ABC, we should not exaggerate it either. This 
chapter has, among other things, tried to examine the efficiency of a surveillance 
technology celebrated – or criticized, depending on the perspective – for its efficiency 
and capacity to create ‘smarter’, impenetrable borders. But, echoing Kelly Gates (2011) 
and William Bogard (2006), if we consider the all-powerfulness of surveillance and 
biometric technologies as givens, as ‘already here to stay’ – indeed, engaging ourselves 
in what Bogard calls ‘the imaginary of surveillant control’–, or if we succumb to the 
naïve fascination of the digital sublime without also acknowledging and analysing the 
shortcomings and sense-making bases of such technologies, we risk contributing to the 
illusion of their proficiencies. The myth, with its preventive effect, becomes part of the 
‘fortress’. Finding a middle way by paying greater attention to the concrete processes 
and authoritative, semiotic premises of such technologies, especially alongside their 
daily users, can give us a more fine-tuned sense of their workings and of their failures to 
fulfil that illusion of omnipotent all-powerful surveillance and impenetrable control. 
What is interesting is to figure out the bases for the claims to veracity of such 
technologies, and the ambiguities that in practice they come to operate with and under 
– in this case, that it suffices to resemble a tiny photo of a face in order to pass a border.  
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NOTES 
 
1 See, for example, Danish police authorities’ guidelines for ID photos concerning postures, props and 
clothing: https://politi.dk/pas/krav-til-pas-og-koerekortfoto 
2 For a description of Frontex operations, see the general introduction to the present book. 
3 Profiling based especially on ethnicity is formally prohibited by European law (European Commission 
2000; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010). 
4 ‘TIP’ images can be either virtual threat items projected into X-ray images of real passenger bags or 
virtual X-ray images of whole bags (Hofer and Schwaninger 2005), depending on the type of screening 
system. In Gibraltar both are used, depending on the security level. 
5 According to the producer of the system, ‘TIP is designed to advance screener proficiency by providing 
more exposure to threats on a regular basis, and to track screener performance’ (Rapiscan 2017). 
 
                                            
